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This paper presents a model of sequential innovation in which industry structure is endogenous 
and a standard of patentability determines the proportion of all inventions that qualify for 
protection (in U.S. patent law this standard is called nonobviousness; in Europe it is called the 
inventive step). The rate of innovation initially rises as this standard is raised from very low 
levels, but eventually falls as the standard is raised to very high levels. Hence, there is a unique 
patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation. Surprisingly, this critical standard is 
more stringent for industries disposed to innovate rapidly. The model suggests a number of 
important implications for patent policy. 
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1.   Introduction  
Recently, economists have investigated, in the context of cumulative innovation, the relationship 
between the availability of patent protection and the rate of innovation (Bessen and Maskin 
2002, Hunt 1999a, O’Donoghue 1998, and Scotchmer 1996). The general conclusion is that an 
industry’s rate of innovation is maximized by protecting some inventions, but not others.  
This paper presents a model in which industry structure (the number of firms engaged in 
R&D) depends in part on the share of all discoveries that qualify for protection, that is, by the 
stringency of the criteria used to examine applications for a patent. In the model, the number of 
firms actively engaged in R&D is the primary determinant of an industry’s rate of progress. This 
in turn depends on the fixed cost of establishing a research facility, the productivity of R&D, and 
the resulting profits generated in the output market. Patentability standards affect expected 
profits because they determine the likelihood that a firm’s invention will lead to a competitive 
advantage and the speed with which that advantage will be eroded.    
When we speak of a standard of patentability in this paper, we focus on American patent 
law’s requirement of nonobviousness, or what is called the inventive step in Europe. To qualify 
for a patent it is not sufficient for an invention to be new; it must also represent a sufficiently 
large advance from the prior art. One can think intuitively of the nonobviousness requirement as 
specifying the minimal advance—the ‘height’ of the inventive step—necessary to qualify for 
protection. 
In the model, industry structure is characterized by a single firm in the output market that 
is eventually replaced by a firm that develops a patentable innovation. We show that the arrival 
rate of these innovations is a non-monotonic function of the stringency of the patentability 
standard applied to inventions. There is a unique critical value of this standard where the rate of  
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innovation in an industry is maximized. This is accomplished by maximizing the number of 
firms that choose to engage in R&D. The critical patentability standard depends on exogenous 
parameters that influence an industry’s propensity to innovate. The critical patentability standard 
is more stringent in industries otherwise pre-disposed to innovate rapidly and less stringent for 
industries predisposed to innovate more slowly. In other words, in order to maximize the rate of 
innovation in “hi-tech” industries, one should require a relatively tall inventive step and not a 
shorter one. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and 
compares it to the existing literature. Section 3 presents the equilibrium and describes its 
properties. Section 4 describes the relationship between the inventive step and the rate of 
innovation and derives the R&D maximizing standard as a function of the exogenous parameters 
that determine an industry’s propensity to innovate. It also presents the first and second best 
solutions to the social planner’s problem. Section 5 examines the policy implications of these 
results. The Appendix contains the proofs of all the propositions.  
2. The  Model 
2.1  An Infinite Sequence of Stochastic Patent Races 
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. Let r > 0 denote the discount rate. Discoveries 
occur at different points in time. Time is divided into the intervals between discoveries. Each 
interval is a patent race. The duration of patent races varies because there is randomness in the 
process that generates discoveries. 
There are  1 t n + firms in the industry, where  0 t n ≥  is determined by a free entry 
constraint that depends on the fixed cost (k > 0) of setting up an R&D lab. This cost is sunk when 
the firm enters its first patent race; new fixed investments are not required thereafter.   
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Firms are indexed by the superscript i. At the beginning of a race, firms simultaneously 
choose their R&D intensity, denoted  [0, ],
i h h ∈ whereh is a very large, but finite, point of 
saturation. Firms maintain their research intensity until a discovery occurs and the current race 
ends. The flow cost of conducting R&D, denoted  ( ),
i C h  is strictly increasing and twice 
continuously differentiable in R&D intensity.   
All firms share the same R&D technology. A firm’s discoveries arrive through time 
according to a Poisson process, where the arrival rate is an increasing function of its R&D 
intensity. Denote the arrival rate of ideas for firm i in patent race q as  ,
i
q h λ  where λ is an 
industry-specific productivity parameter. The probability that firmidiscovers an invention before 
date t in the patent race q is 
- 1- .
i
q t h e
λ⋅⋅ The firm faces a constant rival hazard rate  .
ij
qq ji ah λλ
≠ ≡ ∑  
The probability that firm i wins patent race q is  [] ,
ii i
qqq  hha +  the ratio of firm i’s hazard rate to 
the hazard rate for the entire industry. 
2.2  A Passive Incumbent  
A firm that owns a patented invention will be called an incumbent. The other firms will be called 
challengers. The model contains an additional assumption about the nature of technological 
competition: A firm that makes a patentable discovery does not compete in the subsequent patent 
race.  
  This ad hoc restriction considerably simplifies the model and subsequent analysis, but it 
does not affect the qualitative properties of a model of patent races where the only difference 
between the incumbent and other firms is the rents it earns. In models of this type, being 
successful in a given patent race does not convey a natural advantage over rivals in subsequent 
races. It can be shown that the incumbent will race less aggressively than other firms, because it  
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takes into account the fact that its R&D may replace profits it already earns (Reinganum 1985). 
In other models (Grossman and Helpman 1991), incumbents do not race at all.
1 
2.3  The Nature of Inventions and a System of Property Rights 
A discovery is an improvement in product quality. The extent of an improvement is denoted 
[ ] 0, ,where . q uu u ∈< ∞
2 The magnitude of improvements is random, unknown until the time of 
invention, and common knowledge thereafter. For each invention, u is drawn from the 
continuous density f(u) with corresponding cumulative density F(u). This distribution is constant 
through time and unaffected by the level of a firm’s R&D spending. 
Once a discovery has been made, it can be reverse-engineered at zero cost by all other 
firms. If a patent is granted, the inventor receives an exclusive right to produce and sell that 
invention. The statutory life of the patent is infinite. Not all inventions will be protected, 
however. Let  [0, ] su ∈  denote the minimum extent of improvement for which the patent office is 
willing to grant a patent. In the model, this is the inventive step or standard of nonobviousness. 
An invention whose extent is less than s is not protected and becomes available to all firms.
3  In 
other words, it is added to the public domain of product improvements. Let  () s θ  
1- ( ) Fs = denote the ex-ante probability of obtaining patent protection, given the patentability 
                                                 
1 In that model firms borrow to finance their R&D investments, and the arrival rate of innovations is linear in 
firms’ investments. In that case, the incumbent is at such a disadvantage vis-à-vis its rivals that it cannot finance 
subsequent innovations. It should be noted that in models that contain more asymmetry between firms, the 
assumption made here would significantly affect the properties of the resulting equilibria. 
2 Alternatively, we can express innovations as some percent reduction in the cost of producing the final good. 
The analysis would yield the same results so long as we assume cost reductions are perfectly compatible, so that a 
cost reduction applied to different vintages of technology achieves the same percent reduction in cost. 
3 In the typology of O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998), we assume that lagging breadth is equivalent 
to the magnitude of any patentable invention, while there is no leading breadth.  
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standard s. The expected quality improvement of a patentable invention will be denoted 
[] ()1 () .
u
s u udF u F s =− ∫   
Patent claims are defined as the improvement itself, so each improvement does not 
infringe a patent on another improvement. But when, and under what conditions, will an inventor 
be able to use prior generations of improvements in her product? For example, the firm might be 
required to license all prior improvements from their inventors. At the other extreme, an inventor 
could use all prior discoveries without obtaining a license. In this paper, we adopt an 
intermediate case: if an invention satisfies the standard of patentability, the inventor may use all 
prior discoveries without licensing them. However, if the standard is not satisfied, the prior 
discoveries remain proprietary. One implication of this specification is that there is always, at 
most, one protected invention. Thus while the statutory length of patent protection is infinite, the 
economic life of a patent is the amount of time until the next patentable invention.
4 
Lach and Rob (1996) adopt an alternative approach, where firms embody new technology 
in vintage-specific capital goods. In a model of Cournot competition, the introduction of new 
technologies leads to a more gradual erosion of profits until the older firms exit altogether. In the 
model of O’Donoghue (1998), owners of patented inventions must cross license with each other 
if they are to produce a final good using the best available technology. To reduce complexity, 
O’Donoghue assumes such licenses are achieved, but at the expense of an exogenous 
transactions cost. In his model, a social planner would respond to a higher transactions cost by 
raising the standard of patentability. If cross licensing were required in the model presented here, 
the same intuition would apply. 
                                                 
4 This definition is consistent with the “reverse engineering” defense Congress established for mask rights, a sui 
generis form of intellectual property protecting the physical layout of computer chips (Hunt 1999a).   
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2.4  The Output Market and Flow Profits 
From the preceding section, it is clear that during patent race q, the current holder of a patent can 
offer a product with the best available technology, i.e., one that embodies all the quality 
improvements invented prior to this race. The best any competing firm may offer is a product 
embodying all the improvements except for this last patented invention. Let  ˆq u  denote the extent 
of the innovation protected during race q. Note this is not necessarily the invention that ended the 
previous race. 
  All consumers are identical and aggregate demand is normalized to one. Consumers care 
only about the quality of the good they are consuming. The reservation value of the final product 
to consumers, then, is simply the level of its quality, multiplied by p, the price of the final good 
relative to the R&D inputs.
5  Firms compete in prices and the cost of production is zero. Thus the 
equilibrium price of the final good, and the incumbent’s flow profit, during the qth race is  . ˆq p u ⋅    
  We are interested in the flow profits earned by firms in the next (q+1) race. Several 
things might happen during the current race. Suppose that challenger i invents first in the qth 
race, but the invention is too small to qualify for protection. Because all firms can use that 
invention, the competitive position of firms in the output market is unchanged.
6 In that case, the 
leader during race q continues to earn flow profits of  ˆq p u ⋅  in the next race while all other firms 
earn nothing (see the last column of the table). Alternatively, the magnitude of i’s invention is 
sufficiently large that it qualifies for protection. According to the property rights defined earlier, 
                                                 
5 If we characterize innovations as cost reductions, we get the same behavior by assuming a constant elasticity 
of demand function with an elasticity of one. 
6 For example, research performed by NACA (the predecessor to NASA) in the 1920s and 1930s led to the 
development of significantly more efficient engine cowlings and airfoils. These discoveries were disclosed to all and 
quickly adopted by aircraft manufacturers around the world. Some of these discoveries could have been patented, 
but the government’s policy at the time was not to do so.  
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firm i can also use all previously patented inventions. In that case, during race q+1, firm i will 
earn flow profit  1 ˆqq p up u + ⋅= ⋅ , while the previous leader and all other firms earn nothing (see 
the first column of the table). 
  Flow Profits Earned during Patent Race q+1  
   Innovation  q was  
  The firm is  Patentable  Unpatentable 
  The leader from race (q-1) 0  1 ˆˆ qq p up u + ⋅ =⋅ 
  The winning challenger i 1 ˆqq p up u + ⋅ =⋅  0 
  All other challengers 0  0 
 
2.5  The Existing Literature 
The model builds on the extensive literature on stochastic patent races (Loury 1979, Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz 1980, Lee and Wilde 1980, and Reinganum 1985). The resulting equilibrium is 
similar to ones analyzed in certain models of endogenous growth (Aghion and Howitt 1992 and 
Grossman and Helpman 1991). One can interpret these models as an extreme case of the model 
constructed here, when all innovations satisfy the standard of patentability and every discovery 
eliminates the rents associated with the prior one.  
  Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) examine the optimal combination of 
patent length and breadth. Breadth is the degree to which a product or process must differ from a 
patented one to avoid infringement of the patent. In contrast, the nonobviousness requirement 
distinguishes between proprietary and non-proprietary discoveries. An invention may be obvious 
and yet may not infringe an existing patent. Conversely, an invention may be nonobvious and 
still infringe a prior patent.  
  Scotchmer and Green (1990) is one of the first papers to model the effects of a 
patentability standard. This line of research (which includes Green and Scotchmer 1995,  
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Scotchmer 1996, and Denicolò 2000) examines the role of patents in the context of cumulative 
innovation, i.e., where inventions build on each other. These papers examine, in a two-period 
model, how patents should be designed to achieve an optimal allocation of rents between initial 
and subsequent innovators.  
  There are a now a number of papers that evaluate intellectual property rules in dynamic 
models of sequential innovation. Bessen and Maskin (2002) show that an environment without 
any patent protection can generate more innovation than an environment with patents. The key to 
this result is that inventions in their model are both complementary and essential, so that firms 
benefit from their rivals’ R&D even if they must also share rents with them.  
  The finding that the rate of innovation is a non-monotonic function of the extent (or 
availability) of patent protection is found in several papers.
7 In O’Donoghue (1998) firms choose 
how much to invest in R&D and a deterministic invention size. He shows that a social planner 
can induce more rapid innovation by specifying a minimum invention size that qualifies for 
patent protection. The mechanism is similar to one described here – lengthening the duration of 
incumbency can increase rents and consequently stimulate R&D investments.   
  In Horowitz and Lai (1996), firms choose how fast to race and the extent of the 
innovation they are targeting. They find the market leader will innovate just before its existing 
patent expires and that the extent of its innovation is an increasing function of the patent term. 
They show that the overall rate of innovation is maximized with a patent of finite duration, but 
that social welfare is maximized with an even shorter patent term. In their model, patent length 
(measured in time) plays a role comparable to nonobviousness in this model. 
  The primary difference between the model presented here and the previous literature is 
                                                 
7 See also the papers by Cadot and Lippman (1997) and Chou and Haller (1995). In these models, the incentive 
to innovate is a non-monotonic function of rivals’ exogenously specified  capacity to imitate.   
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that the magnitude of innovations is stochastic and industry structure is endogenous. In this 
environment, the relevant policy parameter is not patent life, which is also endogenous, but the 
minimum invention size that qualifies for protection. The inventive step that maximizes the rate 
of innovation in an industry is the one that maximizes the number of firms engaged in R&D.
8  
3.   Equilibrium 
In this model, the leading firm is a passive recipient of rents earned on its previous patentable 
discovery. Eventually an innovation will occur, ending the current race and possibly the 
incumbent's rents. During the current race, challengers select the R&D intensity that maximizes 
expected current cash flow plus the expected present value of competing optimally in future 
races.
9 The exact magnitude of flow profits associated with a patentable discovery is not known 
until the discovery has actually occurred. Firms take into account the expected magnitude of 
patentable discoveries () u   when choosing their R&D intensity. The challengers move 
simultaneously, taking the number of their rivals as given.  
3.1  The Stationary Symmetric Equilibrium of the Game  
A strategy of a firm in the game is a specification of a feasible R&D intensity to be played in 
each race, for each possible history of the game preceding that race. At the beginning of each 
race, each firm knows the play of all firms in the prior races and the outcomes of those races. 
When the firm is the incumbent, its only feasible R&D intensity is zero. Whenever the firm is a 
challenger, the set of feasible R&D intensities is always the same subset of  . \  There are likely 
                                                 
8 Bernheim (1984) shows that in industries subject to sequential entry, excessively vigorous antitrust 
enforcement results in more concentration, not less. The underlying mechanism is similar to the one explored in this 
paper – if government policies reduce the likelihood of earning significant rents, only a few firms are able to 
amortize their cost of entry. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this parallel. 
9 The objective function for firms in each individual patent race is specified in the Appendix.  
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to be many equilibria of the game, but we focus on stationary equilibria where firms choose 
identical strategies. In the Appendix, we prove the following: 
Proposition 1 - Suppose the R&D cost function satisfies the following 
assumptions: (i)  ( ) 0,  ( ) 0  0; Ch C h h ′ >> ∀ >  (ii)  ˆ () 0  [ 0 , ) ; Ch h h h ′′ >∀ >∈  (iii) 
00 L i m  () / L i m   () 0 ; hh Ch h C h →→ ′ ==  (iv) Lim   ( ) ; h Ch →∞ ′ = ∞  and (v)  
() ,  [ 0 ,) . Ch h <∞ ∀ ∈ ∞  Then, there exists a unique, stationary, symmetric 
equilibrium of the game, characterized by the pair ( *, *), n σ  where there are n* 
challengers who choose a flow R&D intensity  *( 0 , ] . h σ ∈  
The first two assumptions tell us that R&D costs rise with intensity and R&D is eventually 
subject to diminishing returns. Together with the third and fourth assumptions, this ensures there 
will be an interior equilibrium of the stage games. To ensure the existence of a Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium, we need only verify that per period payoffs are bounded. This is ensured by the 
fifth assumption and the fact that the largest invention magnitude is finite.   
  The R&D technology, the distribution of invention magnitudes, and the relationship 
between patented technology and expected profits do not vary across races.
10 If all challengers 
choose the same R&D intensity in all patent races, the probabilities of winning and losing, the 
expected length of races, and the continuation values associated with being the incumbent or a 
challenger will be the same in each race.
11   
 Let  V
I and V
C  denote the present value of a firm that is currently the incumbent and a 
                                                 
10 A more general model would allow for exhaustion of technological opportunities or spillovers from advances 
in other fields. The resulting dynamics would be both complicated and interesting. 
11 Note that the environment is not completely stationary until after the second patent race: In the first race there 
is no incumbent; in the second race, the free entry condition implies that an additional challenger will enter. But this 
does not affect the qualitative properties of the equilibrium analyzed here.    
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challenger, respectively. In equilibrium, the flow value of being a challenger is just equal to the 
expected capital gain that results from making a patentable discovery, less the associated cash 
flow spent on R&D:  () .
CI C  C rV V V θλσ σ =⋅ −−    The first order condition for the challenger’s 
research intensity, holding constant the number of challengers, is simply  () .
IC C VV σθ λ ′ =−     
  The number of firms engaged in R&D competition is determined by the free entry 
condition,  0
C k  V −= (we assume there is no binding integer constraint). In the Appendix, we 
show that this implies  () .
ICCr k VV θλσ σ −= +    In other words, under free entry, the expected 
capital gain from making a patentable discovery is equal to cash flows required to produce it. A 
corollary result is that the average and marginal costs of obtaining a patentable invention are 
equal; that is  () () . CC r k σ σσ ′ =+  
 Of  course  V
I and V
C  are also functions of σ  and n. In the Appendix, we show that 









+ −  −= =  ++ +

 
The difference between the values of being an incumbent and a challenger is simply the 
difference between the respective cash flows discounted by a measure of the economic life of 
patents. Note that the denominator in [1] is increasing in the arrival rate of patentable 
discoveries,  . n θλσ 
  From the preceding analysis, it is clear that we can characterize the R&D intensity of 
firms, *, σ  and the equilibrium number of firms, n*, using the following two expressions: 
[2]      ( ) ( ) ,  and CC r k σ σσ ′ = +   
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3.2  Properties of the Equilibrium 
In a stationary equilibrium, the firms that wish to compete will already have sunk their fixed 
R&D investments. If we consider marginal changes in certain parameters, the number of firms 
engaged in R&D would not decline because the expected value of actively competing in 
subsequent races is strictly positive (so long as k > 0).
12 
  Instead, we compare two symmetric stationary equilibria involving industries that are 
identical except for the value of a single exogenous parameter. Firms take into account the 
exogenous parameters when deciding whether to incur the fixed cost of an R&D lab. In the 
Appendix we show the following: 
Proposition 2 -  (a) σ* is independent of p and λ, and increasing in both r and k; 
(b) n* is increasing in p and λ, and decreasing in both r and k; (c) n*·σ* is 
increasing in p and λ, and decreasing in both r and k. 
  Proposition 2 shows that if R&D is cheaper, or more productive, in one of our 
hypothetical industries, more firms will enter that industry and it will innovate more rapidly. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no difference across industries in the amount of R&D effort by 
individual firms. So many firms enter that any extra rents one would expect to earn (because of 
cheaper or more productive R&D) are simply dissipated.
13   
  The results are more complicated when comparing industries that differ only in the 
discount rate or the fixed cost of establishing an R&D lab. All else equal, a more expensive R&D 
facility can be amortized only if the firm is able to earn more rents from patentable inventions. If 
                                                 
12 More precisely, in this model, once firms decide to enter the industry, there are no shocks to firms’ research 
productivity or costs that would imply any subsequent entry or exit.  
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those rents are indeed higher, the firms that enter will race harder—firm level R&D spending 
will be higher than in the other industry. But this equilibrium can be supported only when fewer 
firms enter in the first place.
14 In other words, higher barriers to entry discourage entry but also 
increase the rents earned by the firms that do enter. The net result, proven in the Appendix, is 
less innovation at the industry level.   
  This model can be compared to the one in Hunt (1999a) where the number of firms is 
exogenous. In a number of instances, the results for firm level R&D investments vary from those 
reported here. For example, in that model, more firms or more productive R&D may be 
associated with smaller R&D investments by individual firms. An increase in the relative price 
of R&D also reduces firm level R&D investments. Still, the comparative static results reported in 
that paper for rates of innovation at the industry level are the same as reported here.
15  
4.  Patentability Standards and the Rate of Innovation 
We typically think of the U.S. patent system as applying a common set of criteria to inventions 
in all technology fields and industries. In this section, however, we construct a hypothetical in 
which two otherwise identical industries are subject to different standards of patentability. Firms 
take this standard into account when deciding whether to sink the fixed cost of an R&D lab. In 
this way we allow for the possibility that patentability criteria affect the number of firms engaged 
in R&D.  
                                                                                                                                                             
13 To see this, note that p and λ  are absent in equation [2].  So long as the cost curve is weakly convex, for any 
given specification of r and k, the equation is satisfied for only one value of  . σ  This is accomplished by a difference 
in n in equation [3] that exactly offsets the effect of any difference in p or λ . 
14 Larger values of k increase the value of σ  where equation [2] is satisfied. To maintain the equality in [3], n 
must take a smaller value. A similar intuition applies for larger values of r. 
15 In a model where there is free entry, but where firms must also sink fixed R&D costs in each patent race, the 
comparative static results at the firm level would lie somewhere between those reported here and in Hunt (1999a). 
The results for rates of innovation at the industry level are the same as reported here.  
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  In equilibrium, firms equate the marginal cost of additional R&D effort to the expected 
gain associated with inventing first. This gain is affected by patentability criteria in two ways. 
First, there is the likelihood that any given invention by a firm qualifies for protection. Second, 
there is a relationship between this probability and the number of rivals a firm competes with. In 
the Appendix we show the following: 
Proposition 3 - In the stationary symmetric equilibrium, (a) σ* is independent of 
s; (b) there exists  *[ 0 ,] su ∈  s.t.  [0, *) ss ∀ ∈ , n* is increasing in s and (* , ] ss u ∀∈ , 
n* is decreasing in s; (c) s* is increasing in p and λ, and decreasing in r and k. 
Thus differences in the standard of patentability (the inventive step) do not affect the R&D 
intensity of individual firms, but they do affect the number of firms actively engaged in R&D 
and, therefore, the industry-wide rate of innovation. For a given set of parameters, there is a 
unique standard (s*) that maximizes the number of firms engaged in R&D. 
  Part (c) of Proposition 3 is again based on a comparison of two industries identical in 
every respect except for one of the exogenous parameters that influence the rate of innovation. 
Without loss of generality, assume that industry A innovates more rapidly than industry B. From 
Proposition 2 we know that this could be because marginal R&D costs less or is more 
productive. Or it may be the case that in industry A either the discount rate or the fixed cost of 
establishing an R&D lab is smaller than in industry B. Regardless of the particular mechanism, 
Proposition 3 shows that the R&D maximizing standard of patentability is stricter for the 
industry that is predisposed to innovate rapidly.  
  If patentability standards were set for each industry, and the R&D maximizing standard 
was chosen in each case, a smaller proportion of innovations would qualify for protection in  
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industry A than in industry B. Let 
*
A s  and 
*
B s  denote the critical patentability for industry A and B, 
respectively. Relative to this benchmark, if a common standard, s , were applied to both 
industries, neither industry would innovate as rapidly because fewer firms would enter these 
industries. Now suppose we consider a common standard that is less strict than s . If s  lies 
between 
*
A s  and 
*
B s , there will be even less innovation in industry A and somewhat more 
innovation in industry B, because even fewer firms would enter industry A but some additional 
firms would enter industry B. The net effect, in terms of welfare, depends on whether such a 
change generates so much additional innovation in industry B that it offsets the lower innovation 
in industry A.
16 
  Note that this result is characterized in terms of the rate of innovation of industries and 
not individual firms. If the only difference between our hypothetical industries is the fixed cost 
of setting up an R&D lab, individual firms in industry B may do more R&D than individual firms 
in industry A. Still, the R&D maximizing standard of patentability would be stricter in industry 
A. This suggests the need for caution in empirical work, as it is at least theoretically possible to 
erroneously associate weaker patentability standards with improved R&D incentives. 
4.1  Deriving the Critical Patentability Standard 
In the Appendix, we show that s* is implicitly defined by the following equation:  
[4]      
(1 )
[( ) ] [( ) ] .
(1 )
n






+= +  ++ 
  
  As the standard of patentability is made more strict (requiring a larger inventive step), 
                                                 
16 In examples where invention magnitudes are distributed normally and R&D costs are quadratic, the increase 
in innovation in industry B does not offset the larger decline in innovation that occurs in industry A. Of course, the 
welfare implications of such changes would depend on consumers’ preferences between the two goods.  
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firms encounter the following tradeoff. On the one hand, a firm that makes a marginal discovery 
would not obtain a patent. The cost of this is the forgone value of the marginal patent plus the 
R&D expended in the subsequent patent race—the right-hand side of [4]. This is the static effect 
of an increase in the patentability standard.  
  But raising the standard also has a dynamic effect, because firms are able to earn flow 
profits for a longer period of time—the left-hand side of [4]. The expected gain is the average 
value of patentable inventions, plus the R&D that would otherwise be expended in the next 
patent race. But the gains enjoyed by incumbents occur at the end of their tenure and are 
discounted accordingly. Thus the relative weight placed on these static and dynamic effects 
depends on the industry-wide arrival rate of patentable discoveries.  
    It may seem counter-intuitive that the benefit to preserving an incumbent’s rents is larger 
when patentable inventions are more frequent. Given that the expected duration of those rents is 
shorter, the present value of the rents might be relatively small. But changes in the standard of 
patentability induce marginal changes in the duration of those rents. In a rapidly innovating 
industry, the rents that are affected are earned relatively soon and therefore are not discounted 
very much. In an industry that innovates less rapidly, increasing the standard of patentability 
contributes additional rents, but they are earned far in the future and are discounted accordingly.  
  Now consider how the tradeoff between static and dynamic effects changes as we vary 
the patentability standard from a very low to a very high value. When the standard is very weak 
(s = 0), the static effect is irrelevant because rents earned on the marginal invention are too small 
to affect the participation decision.
17 In this range, adopting a stricter standard would increase the 
number of firms actively engaged in R&D. But eventually, as the standard is made increasingly 
                                                 
17 This is true whenever  . ps rk <   
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more strict, the dynamic effect becomes smaller while the static effect becomes larger.
18 When 
the patentability standard is very strict, the static effect dominates. For any given specification of 
exogenous parameters consistent with an interior equilibrium there is only one standard, or 
height of the inventive step, where the two effects are exactly equal.   
4.2  The Socially Optimal Standard 
Unlike firms, society enjoys the benefits of all innovations and enjoys those benefits forever. 
Given that the productivity and cost of R&D and the distribution of invention magnitudes do not 
change over time, the socially optimal R&D intensity and number of firms will be the same in 
every patent race. Social welfare is then 
(,) ()
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u v udF u ≡∫   is the average value of inventions. In the Appendix we prove 
Proposition 4: Under the assumptions specified in Proposition 1, (a) the first best 
solution is 
1B *, [ ,  ], su u σσ >∀ ∈  and 
1B ; n = ∞  (b) the second best solution, 
where the social planner is limited to specifying the inventive step, is achieved by 
setting s = s*; (c) 
2B 2B * *, ( *). nn s σσ ==  
An unconstrained social planner would set the R&D intensity of each firm so that the 
marginal cost of generating an innovation would just equal the expected social benefit:  / . pvr λ   
That amount always exceeds the expected private return earned by firms in the model, so the first 
best R&D intensity is always larger than the R&D intensity observed in the private equilibrium. 
                                                 
18 In other words, the industry-wide arrival rate of patentable inventions,  , n θλσeventually declines as s 
increases.  
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Another property of the private equilibrium is that the expected benefit earned by the  innovating 
firm just equals the expected cost of making the discovery. But if the expected social benefit 
exceeds the expected private benefit, it also exceeds the expected cost of making discoveries.
19 
So the social planner would prefer that an infinite number of firms establish an R&D lab. 
  Now suppose that the social planner is limited to choosing the inventive step in order to 
maximize welfare. The second best maximization problem is then 
2B ()
() ( () ) ,
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ns p v
WM a x s C s r k
rr
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where ( ) s σ  and n(s) are the equilibrium research intensity and number of firms that arise in the 
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1. From Proposition 3, we know that the social planner 
can maximize the number of firms that enter the industry by setting s = s*. This, in turn, will 
achieve the most rapid rate of innovation that can be attained in the private equilibrium. But we 
also know from Proposition 3 that the social planner cannot influence the R&D intensity of the 
firms that enter.
20 Consequently, in the second best solution the number of active firms and the 
R&D intensity of those firms is strictly lower than their first best levels. 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper develops a model of cumulative innovation where the profitability of inventions is 
eroded by the introduction of new, competing technologies through time. When firms can readily 
duplicate each other's discoveries, patentability criteria, in particular the requirement of 
                                                 
19 This follows from the free entry condition and the fact that the private and social costs of generating 
innovations are the same. 
20 In a model that assumes a fixed number of firms, the planner’s choice of s would affect the R&D investments 
of individual firms and therefore the entire industry. The normative implications are the same. See Hunt (1999a).  
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nonobviousness (the inventive step) play an important role in determining the share of future 
discoveries that will affect the expected profits earned on patented inventions discovered today.  
  In such an environment, there exists a unique inventive step that maximizes the rate of 
innovation in an industry, by maximizing the number of firms that enter into R&D competition. 
The effect of changes in the inventive step on the industry-wide rate of innovation depends on 
whether the initial standard is more or less stringent than this critical value. This critical standard 
will be more stringent for industries predisposed to innovate rapidly than for industries 
predisposed to innovate slowly. In other words, under the R&D maximizing patentability 
standard, a smaller share of inventions should qualify for protection in rapidly innovating 
industries than in other industries. 
  When a common inventive step is applied to all industries in an economy, the number of 
firms engaged in R&D in each of those industries will depend on the stringency of the standard. 
Generally speaking, when the standard is more stringent, there will be more firms in the 
industries disposed to innovate more rapidly, and fewer firms in industries disposed to innovate 
less rapidly. The converse would be true under a weaker standard. In this context, there is an 
element of industrial policy involved in setting a common patentability standard.   
5.1 International  Implications 
If an R&D maximizing patentability standard was set in different economies, with different 
mixes of industries, it’s likely they would not be the same. The standard would likely be stricter 
in economies that enjoy a comparative advantage in R&D. Adopting the same standard for all 
countries may increase the rate of innovation in some countries but might reduce it in others. Of  
22 
course, more general statements about welfare implications require a model that allows for trade, 
foreign direct investment, and licensing.
21   
  Efforts toward patent harmonization have thus far concentrated on issues such as 
establishing uniform priority, a minimum patent length, fewer subject matter exceptions, 
adequate remedies for infringement (damages, injunctions), and adequate administrative and 
judicial infrastructures. One exception was the proposed Patent Harmonization Treaty, 
abandoned in the mid 1990s, which included a specification of patentability standards (Moy 
1993). Recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office proposed to include, among other things, 
an American-style nonobviousness test in its agenda for future international negotiations on 
patent harmonization (USPTO 2001).      
5.2  A Common Law Standard of Patentability?  
Given that the critical standard is a function of industry characteristics that influence the 
industry’s rate of innovation, this standard will vary as those characteristics change. An 
economy-wide increase in the productivity of R&D, for example, might suggest the inventive 
step should be increased in order to obtain the maximum possible benefit of this new-found 
productivity. If the productivity increase occurred in a single industry, a social planner might 
adopt a more stringent standard, but doing so could reduce the rate of innovation in the other 
industries.  
  The critical inventive step derived from the model presented in this paper follows from an 
explicit balancing of the gains and losses generated by marginal changes in the patent standard. 
A social planner would reduce the inventive step until the value of granting exclusive rights to 
                                                 
21 See the surveys by Maskus (2000) and Saggi (2002). Using the example of computer software, Weiss (2004) 
derives the changes in welfare that result from the sequential adoption of patent protection by different countries.  
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the marginal invention is just equal to the expected value of rents that are lost as the economic 
life of patents is reduced. This has the flavor of a common law balancing test rather than an 
explicit standard specified by law.  
  One can argue that for a very long time, that is how the requirement of nonobviousness 
functioned in the U.S. patent system. The requirement existed in court precedents about a 
century before it appeared in the 1952 Patent Act, which largely adopted the test used by the 
courts. The classic articulation of the test appeared in the 1966 decision Graham v. John Deere:  
At the time it was made, would the invention have been obvious to a practitioner of ordinary skill 
in the relevant field?  If such a determination is influenced by factors such as research 
productivity or costs, the judicial test and the one described in this paper appear quite similar.  
  Recently, some legal scholars have argued that patent standards should be influenced by a 
balancing of costs and benefits (Barton 2001, Rai 2003). But many patent practitioners and 
scholars support relatively stable patentability criteria and an equal treatment of all patentable 
technologies. They argue the patent system is already costly and additional complexity would 
only increase these costs while also increasing uncertainty about future returns.    
5.3  The American Policy Experiments of the 1980s and 1990s 
But patent standards have been changed before. During the 1980s, the U.S. adopted a new form 
of intellectual property (mask rights) to protect the physical layout of semiconductor chips and a 
series of court decisions reduced the inventive step for patents (Hunt 1999a, 1999b). The 
patentability of computer programs was firmly established by the mid 1990s (Hunt 2001). 
Supporters of these changes argued they would stimulate innovation in America’s high 
technology industries. The results of this paper suggest the opposite might well be true —  
24 
weaker patentability standards are more likely to increase R&D in industries that innovate 
slowly, and to reduce R&D in industries that would otherwise innovate rapidly. 
  The final assessment of the changes adopted in the 1980s remains an open empirical 
question.
22  This model suggests at least one testable implication: historical patterns of entry and 
exit from industries may have changed in some systematic way – with relatively more net entry 
into industries that innovate slowly and relatively less net entry into industries that innovate more 
rapidly. Testing that hypothesis is an important topic for future research.    
                                                 
22 Bessen and Maskin (2002) and Bessen and Hunt (2004) argue that granting patents on computer software 
may have been detrimental. See also Kortum and Lerner (1999) and the reviews by Jaffe (2000) and Hunt (1999b). REFERENCES 
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 Proposition 1 -  Suppose the R&D cost function satisfies the following assumptions: 
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Then, there exists a unique, stationary, symmetric equilibrium of the game, characterized by the pair (* ,* ) , n σ  
where there are n* challengers who choose a flow R&D intensity  *( 0 ,] . h σ ∈  
Proof: The proof is constructed through the lemmas that follow.  
Lemma 1 -  Suppose  1 (0, )
W
q   V + ∈∞  and  11 -0 .
WL
qq      VV ++ >  If rivalry and the fixed R&D costs are sufficiently small, at 
least one challenger will choose to enter a stage game. 
Proof: Note that we are treating the continuation values as exogenous parameters. Later we show that, in 
equilibrium, the continuation values satisfy the requirements set out in the lemmas.  
Consider the case where there is no rivalry and fixed R&D costs are zero. We need to show that  (, 0 ) ( 0 , 0 ) .
i ii
qq h   VV ≥  
The inequality is satisfied when there exists some positive level of R&D intensity where  1 () ,
iW i
qq q hV Ch λ + ≥  which is 
satisfied if the minimum average cost of R&D is not too high. The third assumption ensures there is at least one 
R&D intensity  (0, ] hh ∈  where the inequality is strict.  
Now we consider a strictly positive fixed R&D cost k. In that case, a challenger chooses to enter so long as 
1 ()[ ] .
iW i i
qq q q hV Ch r h k λ + ≥+ +  If  1 ˆˆ () ,
iW i
qq q hV Ch λ + > there is also a level of fixed R&D cost where 
1 ˆˆ ˆ ()[ ] .
iW i i
qq q q hV Ch r h k λ + ≥+ +  Thus for k sufficiently small, there are always at least two firms, an incumbent and at 
least one challenger.  
Now suppose there is some small positive level of rivalry. A challenger will enter the stage game if the following 
inequality holds: 
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Applying the preceding argument to this inequality, for k and 
i
q a sufficiently small, there is an R&D intensity in the 
interval (0,h ] where this inequality is strict. So long as  1 0
W
q V + >  and  11 -0
WL
kk      VV ++ > , the magnitude of the 
continuation values will always define a set of pairs (, )
i
q ak
+ ∈\  where the participation constraint is satisfied. We 
can also define a level of fixed R&D cost,  ˆ()
i
q ka where the participation constraint just binds.■ 
Lemma 2 - If  1 (0, )
W
q   V + ∈∞ ,  11 -0 ,
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qq        VV ++ >  and k <  ˆ(0) k , there exists an interior equilibrium of the stage game. 
Proof: The proof of existence is a modification of the existence proof in Reinganum (1985). We continue to treat 
the continuation values as exogenous parameters but take into account the effect of a firm’s choice of R&D intensity 
on the likelihood of winning and the expected length of the patent race. Firms take their rivals’ research intensity as 
given. Fixed R&D costs must be sufficiently low so that at least one firm is willing to engage in R&D.  
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If the saturation point of R&D (h ) is sufficiently large, there will be a finite level of R&D effort where 
(,)0 .
i ii
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iii
qqq Vha is maximized by this level of R&D effort. Let  ()
ii
qq ha denote the firm's best response to 
the level of rivalry it encounters. The strict monotonicity of  (, )
iii
qq ha φ  implies that this best response is unique. The 
strategy space is a convex, compact, nonempty subset of  ,
n \  denoted  1[0, ].
n
i   X  h = ≡ Π  The vector 
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nn
qq qq qq ha ha ha  maps X into itself continuously. Existence of an equilibrium then follows from Brouwer's 
fixed point theorem. ■ 
Lemma 3 -  If  11 [-] - [ ( ) ( ) ] 0 ,
WL
qq q qq      CC     VV hhh λ ++ ′′ ′ +< there exists a unique, symmetric equilibrium of the stage 
game. 
Proof: Existence of a symmetric equilibrium follows from the firm's objective function and first order condition, 
which varies only by the level of rivalry encountered. In the symmetric equilibrium,  (,)
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qq ha φ  becomes 
() ,( -1 ) .
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qq n hh φ  The corresponding first order condition is 
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The first and third terms are strictly decreasing in R&D effort. If the second term is also strictly decreasing, then 
only one level of R&D intensity satisfies the equality. Hence we require that 
11 - - () () 0 .
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The symmetric equilibrium R&D intensity of the stage game with continuation values  1
W
q V + and  1
L
q V +   is denoted 
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Lemma 4 - The game is continuous at infinity. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that total firm payoffs are a discounted sum of per period payoffs and that these per 
period payoffs are uniformly bounded [see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 110]. The per period payoff to firms is 
the present value of flow profits for the incumbent and the present value of R&D expenditures for challengers. The 
maximum per period return for an incumbent is  pu / r . ⋅  Per period returns for challengers are contained in the 
interval [-C(h )/(r + h ), 0]. ■ 
Lemma 5 - Lemmas 1 - 4 imply the existence of a stationary symmetric equilibrium of the game. 
Proof: We return to the first order condition of the stage game, but assume that the continuation values associated 
with winning and losing the current race do not vary across races. Rearranging terms, we have: 
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If firms take the continuation values as given, and these values are constant across races, it is a best response for 
each firm to choose the same R&D intensity in each race. Lemma 3 establishes the existence of such a best response 
for a given specification of the continuation values.  APPENDIX 
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Note that  (1 )
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If we substitute for   ()
I Vh  and  ()
C Vh  in equation [A.3], the first order condition reduces to 
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We use σ to denote the equilibrium R&D intensity that satisfies equation [A.4]. It can be verified that, using 
equation [A.4], the condition required in lemma 3 for the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium of the stage game 
is satisfied.  
If we substitute for  ()
I Vh  and  ()
C Vh  in equation [A.1], the participation constraint is simply  () .
C Vh k ≥  This in 
turn implies  () () () ().
IC Ch r k hV h V h C hh θλ ′  +≤ − =   When the participation constraint binds, we can also 
express the first order condition as  
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During each race, for every challenger, the R&D intensity σ is the unique best response to the continuation values 
()
I V σ  and () .
C V σ  The strategy of playing σ in every race cannot be improved upon by choosing a different R&D 
intensity in one race and playing σ in all the others. If playing σ  in every race cannot be improved upon by a 
deviation in one stage, and the game is continuous at infinity, choosing the R&D intensity σ in each race is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game [see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p.110]. ■ 
Lemma 6 - The symmetric stationary equilibrium is unique. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that there is only one possible intersection of the curves described by [A.4]. At h = 0, 
() 0 Ch ′ = while  [( ) - ( ) ] .
IC hh p u r VV θλ θλ =    Thus at the first intersection, the marginal cost curve must be rising 
faster than  [ ( )- ( )].
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marginal cost, we are done. Define  [ ]
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This rules out an intersection where the marginal cost curve crosses  [ ( )- ( )]
IC hh VV θλ  from above. ■ 
Proposition 2 - (a) σ* is independent of p and λ, and increasing in both r and k; (b) n* is increasing in p and λ, and 
decreasing in both r and k; (c) n*·σ* is increasing in p and λ, and decreasing in both r and k. 
Proof: We reintroduce the relative price of outputs in terms of inputs (p) and rewrite [A.4] and [A.5] in the 
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The change in industry-wide R&D is therefore: 
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The change in industry-wide R&D is therefore: 
  [ ] () ( 1 )
0.
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rr C
σσ θ λ σ σ
σ
σθ λ σ
′  ++ + ∂∂
+= − <  ′ ∂∂ 
■ 
Proposition 3 - In the stationary symmetric equilibrium, (a) σ* is independent of s; (b) there exists  *[ 0 ,] s u ∈  s.t. 
[0, *) s s ∀∈ , n* is increasing in s and (* , ] s su ∀∈ , n* is decreasing in s; (c) s* is increasing in p and λ, and 
decreasing in r and k. 














∂   ∂   ′ Μ= + −  
∂∂   
  
Recall that  1( ) F s θ =−  and  () ,
u
s uu d F u θ =∫   which implies that 
2 () () , s fs s λ Μ= − Ψ  where  
[ A . 7 ]        [ ] { } () ( ) . s Cnr k p s σσ ′ Ψ= +−   
The expression used in the text is obtained by substituting the first order and free entry conditions for  () C σ ′ and rk 
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This establishes part (a) of the proof. For part (b), we must calculate the slope of  () s Ψ : 
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∂∂ ′′ ′ ′ ∂Ψ ∂ = + + − = ⋅Ψ −
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If there is a value  *[ 0 ,] , s  u ∈  where Ψ(s*) = 0, we know that 
* () / - .
s s s  p ∂Ψ ∂ =   Thus there can be at most one 
extremum of Ψ(s). Next we check the values of Ψ(s) as s u →  and  0 s → . These are evaluated most easily if we 
use [A.5] to substitute for  () C σ ′  in [A.7] and evaluate 
[] [ ] () () .
n




 Ψ= −− −  + 
  
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Ψ= −− − <  +⋅ 
 
If the participation constraint is satisfied when s = 0 (i.e. (0) 0 pu rk − ≥  ), the second limit is:  
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Ψ= −+>  + 
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But it is possible that, depending on the distribution of invention magnitudes and the output price, under a very weak 
patentability standard, the participation constraint [A.5] might be violated (i.e. (0) 0 pu rk − <  ). In that case Ψ(s) 
does not exist at s = 0. Instead, define  ˆ s  s.t.  ˆ () 0 pu s rk − =  . Then  () s Ψ exists for  ˆ (, ] . s su ∀ ∈  We also know that 
() s Ψ is initially positive for values of s just greater than  ˆ s , because  ˆ [] 0 ps rk − −> implies that  
[] [ ]
ˆˆ ˆ [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
ˆˆ () 0 .
ˆˆ ˆ [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
Fs ns s
pu s rk ps rk




− −−>  +− 
  
Existence of the extremum then follows from continuity of Ψ(s) over  ˆ (, ] . s u  This establishes part (b) of the proof.   
For part (c), we compute derivatives of the implicit function Ψ(s*) = 0 with respect to the exogenous parameters 
explored in Proposition 2: 
[A.8]  
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where z is either p, λ, r, or k. Note also that  
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iii.  Higher fixed R&D costs: 
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iv.  A higher discount rate: 
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Proposition 4: Under the assumptions specified in Proposition 1, (a) the first best solution is 
1B *, [ ,  ], s uu σσ >∀ ∈  and 
1B ; n =∞ (b) the second best solution, where the social planner is limited to 
specifying the inventive step, is achieved by setting s = s*; (c) 
2B 2B * *, ( *). nn s σσ ==  
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respectively. The first best R&D intensity
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which implies that 
1B * σ σ > . To see that the first best number of firms is infinite, recall that the binding free entry 
constraint in the private equilibrium implies 
** * () () 0 . CC r k σσ σ ′ − −= But under the assumptions specified for the 
cost function in Proposition 1, this implies that the marginal cost of doing R&D exceeds the average cost at the first 
best R&D intensity. Thus 
1B 1B /( ) 0 . pv r C rk λσ σ −− >   Since the expected social benefit of innovations strictly 
exceed the expected cost, the social planner would prefer that an infinite number of firms establish an R&D lab and 
engage in R&D at the rate 
1B σ . This establishes part (a) of the proposition. 
The second best welfare maximization problem is simply 
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s
ns p v
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The first derivative is  
() 1 () ()
( ) (( ) ) (( ) ).
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We know from Proposition 3 that  /0 . s σ ∂∂ =   To show that 
2B W is maximized at s = s*, we need only show that 
** /( ) 0 , pv r C rk λσ σ −− >  which follows from [A.10]. This establishes parts (b) and (c) of the proposition.■ 